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Abstract 
This paper interrogates the concept of technical memory in relation to smart city systems. 
Using the example of the UK air pollution monitoring system AURN (Automatic Urban and 
Rural Network) and how information from this system is displayed in smart phone air 
monitoring apps, the paper theorises the memory of smart systems. Developing the work of 
Tristan Garcia, the paper rethinks Bernard Stiegler’s retentional accounts of technical memory, 
which suggests that memory is held or inscribed on or within a particular technical object. To 
do this it argues that technical memory can be productively considered as a form of artificial 
comprehension. Here, the memory of smart systems are analysed through a variety of logics 
that disclose particular qualities of objects for particular purposes, which shapes how people 
make sense of and respond to their environment. Through the example of AURN, the paper 
suggests that the concept of artificial comprehension is useful for digital geographers studying 
a range of smart and non-smart technical systems. 
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1. Introduction  
Digital networks brought with…[them]…a new kind of economy, based on personal data, 
cookies, metadata, tags and other tracking technologies…These traces constitute hypomnesic 
tertiary retentions. Having become digital, they are today generated by interfaces, sensors and 
other devices, in the form of binary numbers and hence as calculable data (Stiegler 2017 p19-
20). 
 
For Bernard Stiegler (2017), sensor enabled and internet connected ‘smart’ technologies such 
as autonomous vehicles, intelligent lighting systems, phones and watches  are primarily forms 
of tertiary retention, which work to exteriorise various aspects of human experience into tools 
and machines (Stiegler 1998, 2009a, 2010d). Here technical memory is understood as a kind 
of archive or recording that is materially retained in a specific location through a process of 
‘grammatization’ (Stiegler 2017 p19), where thoughts, sounds and other objects are converted 
and spatialised into discrete marks, such as letters, pictures or binary code. In relation to smart 
objects and systems specifically, these tertiary retentions are traces of human action, such as 
data captured through GPS on smart phones and stored in cloud servers (Garde-Hansen 2011; 
Thatcher 2014; Amoore 2018). In Stiegler’s (2017 p15) terminology, the retentions of smart 
objects create ‘habitats’ that can be used to model and predict behaviour forming a ‘society of 
hypercontrol’ (Stiegler 2017 p16). As a result, smart systems work as tools of hypomnesis, by 
standing in for and in turn reducing the capacity of humans to remember and experience 
environments without these systems (Stiegler 2009b, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c). Smart systems 
thus form part of a broader process of ‘smartification’ which ‘hegemonically serves a hyper 
entropic functioning that accelerates the rhythm of the consumerist destruction of the world 
while installing a structural and unsustainable insolvency, based on a generalized stupefaction 
and a functional stupidity’ (Stiegler 2017 p19-20).  
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A number of geographers have explicitly drawn upon Stiegler’s theory of retention to theorise 
socio-spatial relations in a range of objects as diverse as social media (Kinsley 2014), escalators 
(Bissell 2014), geovisualisations of motorways (Bissell and Fuller 2017), community mapping 
exercises (Wilson 2014) and videogames (Ash 2012, 2013, 2015), alongside broader issues 
around automation (Bissell and Del Casino 2017) and smart cities in general (Rose 2017). This 
work forms part of a broader literature in geography that explicitly theorises the memory of 
smart systems as a kind of archive or trace. For example, work on spatial media  regularly 
considers technical memory as retention when it suggests that digital memory are ‘fumes’ 
(Thatcher 2014) that are ‘left’ within an app, platform or space (Kitchin, Lauriault, and Wilson 
2017; Leszczynski 2014; Wilmott 2016a, 2016b; Galloway 2004; Dodge and Kitchin 2007a; 
Verhoeff 2012). As Elwood and Mitchell (2014 p148-149).  put it: 
[a]pplications such as Facebook store and organize our activities into ‘timelines’ and circulate 
these digital histories of our lives to others in our online social networks. Digital histories are 
constituted through the traces left in databases and websites as we use geosocial applications 
such as FourSquare to “check in”. 
In turn, this work regularly links definitions of technical memory as a trace or archive to smart 
technologies capacity to control and survey human activity (Gabrys 2015; Kitchin 2014; Batty 
et al. 2012; Frith 2015; Kuniavsky 2010; Strengers 2013; Pink and Fors ; Pink et al. 2017). For 
instance, Lupton (2013, 2016) argues that smart objects such as health tracking watches result 
in a form of ‘dataveillance’, where events of a person’s life are ‘archived’ and can be used to 
discipline and control that person (on digital surveillance also see: Adey et al. 2013; Andrejevic 
2007; Bennett 2001; Ellis, Tucker, and Harper 2013; Leszczynski 2015; Leszczynski and 
Crampton 2016; Wilmott, Fraser, and Lammes 2017).  
4 
 
Rather than tertiary retentions, which act as an archive or log that work to control what humans 
can do, the paper draws upon the thought of Tristan Garcia (2013, 2014a, 2014b) to consider 
the memory of smart systems as a form of artificial comprehension. Distinct from retentional 
perspectives, which consider technical memory in terms of inscriptions or traces left in the 
world, the concept of artificial comprehension sees memory as an ongoing process, whereby 
smart objects are designed to disclose different qualities of the objects they encounter (Ash 
2017). In doing so, the specificity of these qualities alter the appearance of environments and 
how they are experienced and understood. This perspective suggests that smart systems are not 
monolithic entities that inevitably give way to corporate control, ‘forgetting’ or ‘stupidity’ as 
Stiegler puts it and neither do these systems just enable a complete or total form of archiving 
of human experience that is ripe for data mining (Beer and Burrows 2013). Instead, the 
multiplicity of ways that technologies can artificially comprehend objects provides the 
possibility for new ways of sensing, thinking and knowing environments, which exceed the 
corporate or governmental intention of the design and implementation of these systems. This 
is important because it highlights the fragility of smart  systems and provides a starting point 
for interrogating and remaking them for more inclusive and civic purposes (Marres 2007). 
To demonstrate how the memory of smart systems can be theorised as forms of artificial 
comprehension and the ways these artificial comprehensions affect how environments appear 
to users, the paper draws upon the example of the UK air monitoring system AURN (Automatic 
Urban and Rural Network). Specifically it explores how air samples from particular AURN 
monitoring stations are collected and then made differently present via two air pollution 
monitoring apps for smart phones: Plume and London Air. AURN is an interesting smart 
system and Plume and London Air are interesting apps to discuss in this paper, because they 
are designed to address the increasing problem of air pollution in the UK, which causes serious 
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health problems including breathing issues such as asthma and has led to increased mortality 
rates. The World Health Organisation (2014) now estimates that over seven million people a 
year die as a result of exposure to air pollution, which accounts for one in eight of total global 
deaths. Utilising the publicly available data from AURN, a range of software developers have 
produced apps that work in conjunction with smart objects such as smart phones to enable 
individuals to monitor air pollution levels in the spaces of their everyday lives. As such, AURN 
forms a useful counterpoint to discussions of smart systems and objects that tend to emphasise 
the way they work as technologies of surveillance (Kember and Zylinska 2015; Best 2010; 
Bogard 2015; Crawford, Lingel, and Karppi 2015; Rosenblat and Stark 2015). Rather than 
simply recording or retaining information, I argue these apps operate according to a variety of 
logics and in doing so generate potentially different ways that air pollution can become 
intelligible. In turn, these apps enable alternate modes of addressing the environmental, social 
and political issues that surround air pollution. 
To illustrate how the memory of smart systems and objects can be understood as sets of 
artificial comprehensions, the rest of the paper is structured into four main sections. In the next 
section, I utilise the work of Garcia to define air pollution as sets of objects that comprehend 
one another. Section three defines artificial comprehension and demonstrates how air pollution 
is artificially comprehended by the AURN monitoring stations.  In the fourth section, I discuss 
the Plume and London Air apps, and how they artificially comprehend data from the AURN 
stations to show how smart objects alter the way air pollution appears to the users of these apps. 
To conclude the paper suggests that the concept of artificial comprehension is useful to 
understand digital memory and spatial experience beyond the specific example of smart 
systems and objects. 
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2. Comprehending Air pollution  
Kampas and Castanas (2008 p362) define air pollution in the following way:  
 
an air pollutant is any substance which may harm humans, animals, vegetation or material. As 
far as humans are concerned an air pollutant may cause or contribute to an increase in mortality 
or serious illness or may pose a present or potential hazard to human health. In the context of 
human health, ‘‘risk’’ is the probability that a noxious health effect…may occur.  
 
In turn, they identify four main types of pollutants: ‘1. Gaseous pollutants (e.g. SO2, NOx, CO, 
ozone, Volatile Organic Compounds). 2. Persistent organic pollutants (e.g. dioxins). 3. Heavy 
metals (e.g. lead, mecury) 4. Particulate Matter’ (Kampa and Castanas 2008 p362-363). From 
this position, air pollution is defined extensively in terms of the number of these particles in 
the air, which can be affected by a range of factors, including wind direction and speed, natural 
topography and the presence, type and density of buildings in an area (Hatzopoulou and Miller 
2010; Biggeri et al. 1996). Broadly speaking, the more particles in a particular area, the greater 
the amount of pollution there is said to be and the fewer the particles, the lower the amount of 
pollution. Here, pollution is understood to amass and travel over or through time, with 
temporality used as a quantitative marker to denote changes in pollution levels (Schwartz and 
Marcus 1990; Dominici et al. 2002; Niska et al. 2004).  
 
Modifying  the work of Tristan Garcia (2014b) we can define air pollution quite differently, 
not as an extensive mass of individual particles that gather and travel, but as a comprehension. 
The notion of comprehension is based upon Garcia’s desire to produce an anti-substantialist, 
anti-reductionist notion of objects. As Cogburn (2017 p11) outlines, anti-substantialism 
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attempts to avoid explaining objects by recourse to smaller or more fundamental objects or 
forces: 
 
if we could explain a putative kind of thing (say, chemical compounds) entirely in terms of 
another kind of thing (say sub-atomic particles composing the compounds and the fundamental 
forces to which they are subject), then there would be no reason to be ontologically committed 
to chemical compounds any more. All that would really be there would be the subatomic 
particles and the fundamental forces. 
 
To avoid a reductionist notion of objects, Garcia suggests that an object is ‘that which 
differentiates what it comprehends from what comprehends it’ (Cogburn 2017 p111). Or in 
other words an object is the difference between what it contains (its parts or pieces) and what 
contains it (other objects). Garcia formally names what an object contains, its being and what 
contains that object, its comprehension. Comprehension thus refers to how an object is defined 
by the way it is located and situated within a broader category, which gives it a sense of its 
being. ‘Comprehension is having something inside itself…[It]…is also comprehending an 
element by being a set; comprehending one quality by being a substrata of qualities’ (Garcia 
2014b p107).  Garcia gives the example of being in a room to explain this model of 
comprehension: 
 
I am present in this room when I am in the room and the room comprehends me. I am absent 
from the room when this room comprehends me in some way (the room comprehends my 
memory, the fact that I was there, my footprints, the possibility that I could be there, for my 
thought or for that of another), though I am not inside the room (Garcia 2014b p169). 
 
8 
 
From this position, any particular object is not reducible to an innate substance, but is the 
tension between what that thing is (its being) and how this being is comprehended by a category 
or object that contains it. Modifying Garcia’s account of comprehension somewhat we can 
state that air pollution cannot be reduced to its quantified amount, but is better defined by the 
way it is comprehended by other things. In my definition comprehension refers to the qualities 
of an object that are disclosed to another thing (human or non-human) through the specificity 
of its relation with that thing. These relations are private, non-totalisable and can’t necessarily 
be viewed, observed or recorded from outside of that relation. Take sulphur dioxide (S02), a 
key air pollutant. From the perspective of chemistry, sulphur dioxide is a compound composed 
of two oxygen atoms and one sulphur atom. But, understood as a comprehension, sulphur 
dioxide is a different kind of object depending on what it is comprehended by and may only 
appear that way to that particular object. A human tongue might comprehend a high 
concentration of sulphur dioxide through the qualities of acidity, while a fish in a body of water 
might comprehend it through the quality of choking. From this position analysing air pollution 
means investigating the different objects that comprehend it and identifying what qualities they 
disclose. In this case, these objects include the AURN monitoring station and humans whose 
health is negatively affected by the pollutants.  
 
3. Artificially comprehending air pollution 
In the UK, air quality monitoring has been conducted by the Department for Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) using a network of automatic recording stations (called 
AURN) since 1972. Prior to this, manual forms of air monitoring have been conducted since 
1961. The daily air quality index that is used by DEFRA to provide air quality information is 
based upon measuring the presence of five main pollutants: ozone (03), nitrogen dioxide (N02), 
sulphur dioxide (S02), particulate matter (PM10) and fine particulate matter (PM2.5). These 
9 
 
pollutants are created from different sources and tends to have different health effects. For 
example, nitrogen dioxide is created from combustion, including heating and electricity 
generation and contributes to the development of asthma, while particulate matter is generated 
through traffic and can create nasal allergies and increase the risk of lung cancer (Samet, 
Marbury, and Spengler 1987; Smith et al. 2000; Turner et al. 2011).  
  
Each AURN station contains a range of different sensing devices that utilise a variety of 
techniques in order to measure the presence of these pollutants. For instance, nitrogen dioxide 
is usually measured through the technique of chemiluminescence, using a device such as a 
Chemiluminescent Nitrogen Oxides Analyzer, whereas ozone is measured via the technique of 
UV absorption, using a device such as a UV-VIS Spectrophotometer. Through these devices, 
information about the presence of pollutants is monitored constantly and collated on an hourly 
basis, which can then be accessed by the public through a range of interfaces, such as the 
DEFRA website, DEFRA telephone line and a range of third party smart phone apps.  
 
We can draw upon Garcia’s work to claim that the AURN monitoring stations do not represent 
or retain a memory of a past or absent event of air pollutants presence in an environment.  
Rather, the AURN stations work to artificially comprehend pollution in a variety of ways. To 
explain Garcia’s account of memory as a kind of artificial comprehension, he discusses his 
childhood : ‘my childhood is present in me and in the rest of the world, in the traces that I have 
left of it, in objects, photographs, imprints, and changes that I have caused; the past is not an 
absolute non-being, but a fading presence, which withers and passes’ (Garcia 2014b p183). 
Here memory refers to a kind of negative of an object : ‘absence is the event of the withdrawal 
of thing from its form, its negative, which persists in objective form (as a sign, an imprint, a 
fragrance, a memory, an image, and so on)’ (Garcia 2014b p47). In this account, memory 
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becomes a kind of ‘artificial comprehension’. To explain this Garcia offers the example of 
remembering a lover. He suggests:  
 
By accumulating the memory of my lover, which is with me, and the fact that my lover is 
currently elsewhere, I create the chimera of an absence, an emptiness, or a being that I 
comprehend within me, but which is not with me. In reality my lover is not absent, since I must 
relate to her memory, or to the projection that I make of her actual distant being: her memory 
or image is present for me. Strictly speaking, of course, my lover is neither her memory nor 
her image. But since I can identify my lover with what she is in my memory or in my 
imagination, I can lack her, I can artificially comprehend her, contain her inside me without 
being there inside me (Garcia 2014b p171 emphasis added).  
 
Here memory operates as a device of comprehension that takes one of two forms. Either an 
object can contain something inside it, without that object actually being there (which Garcia 
terms emptiness) or an object can be contained in something, without being comprehended by 
it (which Garcia terms exile). Developing Garcia’s idea of memory, we can modify his notion 
of artificial comprehension to theorise a non-human memory of smart systems and objects. 
Simply put, artificial comprehension refers to the way technologies are designed and 
manufactured to disclose particular qualities of objects for particular purposes. Here artificial 
comprehension is not just about the absence of objects, but about comprehending those objects 
using a distinct set of methods, techniques or logics and thus disclosing qualities from the form 
or negative of previous objects. In the case of the air pollution monitoring networks, artificial 
comprehensions work to change how air pollution appears through the way particular 
instruments are designed to comprehend particular kinds of object. 
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For instance, consider how many AURN stations monitor nitrogen dioxide, through the 
deployment of devices such as a Chemiluminescent Nitrogen Oxides Analyzer. The analyser 
uses the chemiluminescence technique to comprehend the concentration of Nitrogen dioxide 
in the air.  The most basic form of 
chemiluminescence describes the process of fluorescence resulting from a chemical reaction. 
The chemiluminescent sampler for the measurement of NO2 relies on the reaction of NO with 
O3
 
to produce an “excited” form of NO2. As the excited molecule returns to its ground state, 
fluorescent radiation is emitted, the intensity of which is proportional to the concentration of 
NO (AQEG 2004 p114). 
Depending on the particular device used, this reaction is enabled by introducing a sample of 
nitrogen dioxide collected from the air into a reaction chamber. Ozone is then added into the 
chamber creating a chemical reaction that produces a quantity of light for each nitrogen dioxide 
molecule that is reacted. The fluorescent radiation given off by this reaction is then measured 
by a component such as a photomultiplier tube. According to Abramowitz and Davidson (2015 
n.p.), photomultiplier tubes are a ‘photo emissive device in which the absorption of a photon 
results in the emission of an electron. These detectors work by amplifying the electrons 
generated by a photocathode exposed to a photon flux’. More specifically,  
 
[p]hotomultipliers acquire light through a glass or quartz window that covers a photosensitive 
surface, called a photocathode, which then releases electrons that are multiplied by electrodes 
known as metal channel dynodes. At the end of the dynode chain is an anode or collection 
electrode. Over a very large range, the current flowing from the anode to ground is directly 
proportional to the photoelectron flux generated by the photocathode (Abramowitz and 
Davidson 2015 n.p.). 
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When the nitrogen dioxide is introduced into the reaction chamber, we could suggest that the 
reaction chamber comprehends it, which in turn discloses different qualities of the nitrogen 
dioxide’s being. Here, being refers to ‘belonging to something…having a quality…being 
situated in something’ (Garcia 2014b p107). Belonging to the reaction chamber, the nitrogen 
dioxide becomes a different thing when the ozone is introduced into the chamber. The ozone 
works to comprehend the nitrogen dioxide by placing it within the newly formed environment 
of the reaction chamber plus ozone and in doing so alters the object itself. This is because the 
new environment alters the tension between what the nitrogen dioxide is (the particular 
arrangement of particles of nitrogen and oxygen) and what that nitrogen dioxide enters into (a 
sealed chamber with ozone). By altering the relation and tension between the nitrogen dioxide’s 
being and comprehension, new qualities of these objects are disclosed, and in this case the new 
quality becomes an object itself:  light. 
In the same way, the light is then comprehended by the photomultiplier tube, which alters the 
tension between ‘what enters into the thing, and what the thing enters into’ (Garcia 2014b 
p122), which in turn discloses different qualities of the light. For instance, the photons of light 
are comprehended by the photo cathode, which are then comprehended by the dynodes and 
anodes, which are then comprehended by an output meter, through which the electrons are 
comprehended within a broader category of mathematical units that allow recording, 
measurement and comparison. Through these multiple acts of artificial comprehension, 
particular objects come to be named and identified as a specific concentration of nitrogen 
dioxide.  
In each of these artificial comprehensions, the object itself changes, while being informed by 
the negative of its previous form. Referring to form, Garcia (2014b p139) suggests: ‘a form is 
a things negative, reverse side and condition. My hands form is everything except my hand’. 
13 
 
This account is quite distinct from Stiegler (2017 p31), who argues a smart system ‘whatever 
its form or material may be, artificially retains something through the material and spatial 
copying of a mnesic and temporal element’. From a Garcian perspective, the form of the 
previous object is not retained as a presence, copy or even translation of that object, but as an 
absence, or negative of an object. Once the nitrogen dioxide has been exposed to ozone and 
the light generated by this reaction measured by the photomultiplier tube, there is not a material 
trace or retention of this reaction in the measurement output. Rather, the output measurement 
is predicated upon the disclosure of a series of qualities of previous objects as they comprehend 
one another. These previous comprehensions are not present in the comprehension that 
becomes registered as the output measurement because the quality of that object is specific to 
the comprehension in question. Previous comprehensions therefore become the condition of 
possibility of the output measurement while remaining absent from the comprehension itself. 
This account is useful because it enables a more open and transformational mode of analysis 
than Stiegler’s account of memory can sometimes imply. For Stiegler, the tertiary retentions of 
smart systems are so problematic because they narrow and limit consciousness by creating 
increasing numbers of automated processes that stand in for human thought. In his words: 
‘understanding has been automatized as the analytical power delegated to algorithms executed 
through sensors and actuators operating according to formalized instructions that lie 
outside…intuition’ (Stiegler 2017 p27). As a result, ‘the…automatic society consists sets up a 
new mental context – stupefaction – within which systematic stupidity proliferates. The result 
is a significant increase in functional stupidity, drive-based capitalism and industrial populism’ 
(Stiegler 2017 p30). But, in developing the concept of artificial comprehension we can suggest 
that smart systems do not just convert analogue lived experience into reductive digital data. 
Instead the artificial comprehensions of smart objects alter the intelligibility of an environment 
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by altering which objects appear and how they appear. In doing so, the logics of  artificial 
comprehension can inform how people move through, experience  and understand space and 
can potentially alter the way air pollution appears as a social and political issue in ways that 
are far more ambivalent than Stiegler might suggest. To illustrate this point, we can now discuss 
the way artificial comprehensions gathered at the AURN monitoring sites are also artificially 
comprehended by air pollution monitoring apps, which present air pollution in a variety of 
ways to smart phone users.  
 
4. Air pollution apps and the logics of artificial comprehension  
In response to concerns about falling levels of air quality in the UK, a number of smart phone 
apps have been released that present regularly updated data regarding air pollution from AURN 
monitoring stations in a range of formats. The following section examines two of these apps in 
particular: Plume and London Air. Each app artificially comprehends the data from the 
monitoring stations and works to modulate how pollutants appear in an environment according 
to different logics, which exceed an account that focuses on hypomnesis or total surveillance 
alone. In doing so, these logics produce different ways of thinking about and experiencing air 
pollution and the spaces in which air pollution exists. We can term these logics dispersal and 
delimitation. 
 
a) Dispersal  
Dispersal refers to the way air pollution is artificially comprehended as an abstract unit that 
creates a vague sense of the presence of pollutants that are hard for the user to locate in their 
environment. In Plume, dispersal is achieved through a core dashboard that displays the Plume 
Index for a given city. The Plume index is built on the Air Quality index and the AURN 
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monitoring stations used by DEFRA in its air quality reports. The Plume index is displayed 
graphically and numerically. When opening the app, you are greeted with a circle and a white 
bar that wraps around the circle. Next to the white bar is a series of colours that line the interior 
of the circle. These colours range from blue (clean air) to pale pink (moderate pollution) to 
brown (high pollution) to grey (very high pollution) to black (extreme pollution). Depending 
on where the white bar stops, one can ascertain the current level of pollution. The bar is 
supplemented by a stylised anthropomorphic cloud that has eyes and a mouth. When the air is 
clear the cloud is smiling, when moderate pollution is detected the cloud has a straight mouth 
and so on.  If you swipe right within the circle this gives you the Plume index in relation to the 
yearly average for your city or region and swiping right again gives you levels of ozone, 
nitrogen oxide, and particulate and fine particulate matter in a numerical format. Below the 
Plume index a line graph displays levels of pollution across time. Swiping right, the temporal 
scale can be altered. Data can be presented at hourly intervals across the space of one week or 
monthly across the space of one year. Swiping right also provides advice about the type of 
activity it is safe to undertake at different times of the day, given the pollution level. There are 
four types of activity listed: outdoor sports, cycling, bring baby out and eating outside. 
Depending on the pollution index, the app will suggest to ‘Enjoy it!’ ‘Take it easy’ or ‘Take 
Care’.  
 
Through the construction of this interface, Plume artificially comprehends air pollution data in 
different ways. For instance, take the Plume index score and the graphical dial that surrounds 
it. By splitting the dial using white lines and colouring the interior of the dial, the pollution data 
from the monitoring sites is artificially comprehended as a new object: a bar that moves from 
zero (fresh air) to one hundred and fifty (extreme pollution). This dial works ‘through a law of 
exchange…the absenting of something present entails the presentation of something absent’ 
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(Garcia 2014b p250). In this case, the dial works to present something absent (the air pollution 
measured at the monitoring station), but in doing so absents the very presence of this pollution 
(the pollutions form in the air, prior to its artificial comprehension by the monitoring station). 
In doing so, Plume generates an artificial comprehension of the region or area that the user is 
monitoring as an abstract and undifferentiated entity through this interplay of presence and 
absence.  For example, there are around two hundred and twenty air quality monitoring sites 
across the UK. Two of these are located in Newcastle Upon Tyne, where I am currently located. 
One is on Cradlewell roadside and the other is in Newcastle city centre. According to the Plume 
app, the current pollution levels, at the time of writing, are moderate and it recommends that if 
I wanted to partake in outdoor exercise or take a baby outdoors that I should ‘take it easy’. 
However, I am in Gosforth, two miles north of the Cradlewell roadside monitoring station. As 
the information page of the app itself recognises, air quality is highly localised, with micro 
variations in air temperature, positioning of buildings and so on leading to radically different 
levels of air quality only metres apart. In Plume’s (2016 n.p.) words:  
 
add a little gust of wind or a ray of sunshine, a morning traffic jam, a residential heating 
peak…and air quality is turned upside-down in a matter of minutes, for better or worse! Hence 
the importance of following its evolution closely. Obviously, you don’t have time to keep 
checking pollution indexes…but thanks to Plume you can get real-time notifications :-). 
 
As such the way Plume artificially comprehends air pollution creates quite a vague sense of 
where the pollution is located because it is based on a set of comprehensions between a small 
number of technical objects (two monitoring stations for a whole city, the servers at Plume and 
the users smart phone).  In turn, this comprehension creates a vague sense of Gosforth as an 
environment for the user. Sitting in Gosforth I can either uncritically accept the pollution index 
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Plume provides or I can recognise its limitations. If I uncritically accept that the pollution is 
actually moderate today in my location, this shapes how space appears for me. Following the 
apps suggestions, I choose to take it easy and cycle one mile rather than four. I may not choose 
to take the baby for a walk. I may keep the windows of my house shut and so on. If I choose to 
critically reflect on how closely the pollution index ties to my particular locality, relations of 
near and far become indeterminate to me. Where exactly is the pollution moderate? Is there a 
way for me to avoid the pollution?  In doing so, Plume discourages the user from becoming 
sensitised to the micro ecology of objects that shape how pollution amasses and travels. The 
degree of abstraction that the logic of dispersal enables, could be considered both productive 
and problematic. Productively, Plume might encourage users to take action over what they see 
as unacceptable levels of pollution that the app makes intelligible for them. Problematically, 
the app makes it difficult to make informed decisions that are sensitive to the actual location 
of the user at the time. In either case, the way Plume artificially comprehends air pollution can 
have important consequences for how the user’s environment appears to them. 
 
b) Delimitation 
Delimitation refers to the way the temporality of air pollution is spatialized and in doing so 
appears to be differentially present in an area. The logic of delimitation is particularly evident 
in the London Air app. The London air app draws upon the Automatic London Network (ALN), 
a subset of the wider AURN network. The ALN consists of 14 monitoring stations across 
London, enabling a much more detailed artificial comprehension of air pollution than other 
cities, which might only have two AURN monitoring stations in total. The greater number of 
monitoring sites, in concert with computational modelling creates an artificial comprehension 
of air pollution that is overlaid onto a cartographic map of London. While Plume provides one 
overall score for a whole city, London Air offers a micro differentiated colour coding system 
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that visualises pollution on a more local scale. Using London Air, the user has to rely on their 
own interpretations of different coloured rectangles that overlay the map, ranging from blue to 
denote ‘low’ levels of pollutants to orange for ‘moderate’, red for ‘high’ and black for ‘very 
high’. Together these shades form a heat map of the presence of pollution on screen. 
 
The space that appears for the user is then partially constructed by the sample resolution of the 
data and how this data is artificially comprehended as a coloured rectangle and how these 
rectangles relate to one another to form a heat map. The London Air app cuts London into 
rectangular units of around 5 meters square. Of course, these rectangles provide 
approximations of the presence of pollutants, but due to pollutants necessarily diffuse nature 
and the predictive nature of the app’s comprehension of the data, such approximations are 
never completely accurate. For example, as I write, London Air shows that that there are 
‘moderate’ levels of pollutants at the corner where Oxford Street meets Bayswater Road, while 
the immediate areas surrounding Oxford Street have low levels of pollutants. In doing so, the 
heat map produced by the app acts as a kind of artificial comprehension, giving the air pollution 
its supposed form. For example, the heat map itself acts as a kind of negative of the pollution, 
much like a photo negative. ‘In photography, the fixed light on a surface…appears as a 
hole…which gives form to faces, streets and landscapes which we know are absent’ (Garcia 
2014b p250). As a kind of negative or form of a presence that is absent (the air pollution), the 
heat map in turn enables specific pollutants that are undetectable to the human senses to become 
present and thus intelligible in particular locations.  
 
In other words, the way London Air artificially comprehends the air pollution alters the 
intelligibility of London as a city. For example, perhaps a user might consult the app and decide 
to cross the street to avoid what the app considers to be a particularly polluted area. Rather than 
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nearness and farness being organised around the objects that make up the urban street scene, 
such as roads, pavements, traffic lights and so on, near and far become organised around the 
assumed presence of pollutants, as denoted by the heat map in the app. In doing so, the user 
may have to work against the objects that make up the street scene to avoid these pollutants. 
Perhaps they walk along a bike lane to stay within green quadrants or cross the road at a non-
pedestrian crossing point to move from a red to an orange zone. In either case, the way the app 
artificially comprehends the air pollution through the heat map potentially encourages different 
forms of engagement and response than when a user engages with the street without the app.  
 
London Air also artificially comprehends air pollution through its ability to send notifications 
to a user’s home screen. Users can subscribe to be updated regarding the pollution levels at 
specific sites and receive text notifications and alerts through the app when pollution levels 
become moderate or high. Imagine receiving a notification every day at 8am that particulate 
pollution has increased from low to moderate or from moderate to high on a junction that you 
regularly walk through on the way to work. Perhaps over time the notifications come to jar you 
enough to change your habits and take a different route to work to avoid this pollution black 
spot. In doing so the artificial comprehension of the app has constructed a form in which the 
presence of a space and distinctions between near and far have altered. What was once simply 
a part of an everyday journey takes on a new form. Suddenly the space of the city is cut and 
split into different quantities of air pollution that are defined by the pollution’s extensity on the 
heat map and through which the city is comprehended by the user. In other words, London Air 
makes particular points of the city intelligible as an environment that is associated with 
potentially negative health effects in ways that would remain unintelligible without the app.  
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5. Conclusions 
This paper has used the example of air pollution monitoring stations and air pollution 
monitoring apps to think through the question of memory in relation to smart systems and 
objects. Rather than defined as a retention, the paper suggests the memory of smart systems 
can be understood as a form of artificial comprehension. This account challenges a notion of 
retention as a static store or archive that is imprinted into a material thing. Instead, the notion 
of artificial comprehension allows us to consider memory as a dynamic form of absence, which 
actively alters what objects and qualities appear as they become comprehended by other objects 
in a smart system.  
 
The concept of artificial comprehension thus allows us to consider how the technical memory 
of smart systems is both subject to change and also contains a kind of durability. Technical 
memory changes as the very object of that memory is comprehended by other objects. But, the 
artificiality of its comprehension ensures that the previous object’s form is maintained as a 
condition of possibility for the next artificial comprehension to occur. In the case of air 
pollution monitoring apps, these artificial comprehensions begin when the instruments at the 
monitoring site comprehend various particles and end when these measurements are 
comprehended as visualisations on a screen that a user engages with. Understanding technical 
memory as artificial comprehension thus provides a mode of analysis that allows us to trace 
how smart systems have effects through the way they actively shape the kinds of object that 
appear to users and in turn how these users comprehend the environments they move through. 
 
In demonstrating this argument, the paper points to an alternative way of thinking about the 
social and political problems that Stiegler (2017) and other critics of smart technology such as 
Dodge and Kitchin (2007b) suggests emerge when human memory is exteriorised into smart 
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objects and systems. For Dodge and Kitchin, one political response to the problems with smart 
systems is to design in ‘forgetting’, understood as a periodic wiping of data, which enables 
people to not be entrapped by the archives of information stored about them. In their words, 
‘memory should always be complemented by forgetting…[F]orgetting is not a weakness or a 
fallibility, but is an emancipatory process that will free…[users]…from burdensome and 
pernicious disciplinary effects’ (Dodge and Kitchin 2007b p441). Understanding the memory 
of smart systems as a form of artificial comprehension suggests that there can be no total store 
of memory about an individual, because each comprehension is always selective and based 
upon the form or absence of a previous comprehension. In doing so, the concept of artificial 
comprehension offers a more hopeful account for challenging smart systems and objects, 
because it points to the fragile and contingent nature of their memory and their fundamental 
incapacity to retain a complete or total record of the past.  
 
In other words, the power of smart systems and objects is not the way they automate, monitor 
or stand in for human memory alone. The power of these systems are also about how they 
actively alter human intelligibility in ways that exceed exteriorisation and data capture. As a 
discussion of Plume and London Air demonstrate, understanding the way these apps operate 
can reveal the contradictions and tensions of these systems in ways that avoid simple narratives 
of outright denunciation or celebration. A Garcian reading of air pollution monitoring systems 
and apps would suggest that the artificial comprehensions of these devices alters how air 
pollution appears and in doing so open new domains to understand and contest the objects that 
generate this pollution.  Indeed, it is only by focusing on the specificity of smart systems and 
the way particular objects generate artificial comprehensions that we can begin to understand 
the role they might play in helping to solve societal problems such as air pollution (Marres 
2007). As Gabry’s (2014; 2016) suggests, these solutions can include the development of 
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citizen science projects and activist campaigns that work to change policy and law around the 
kinds of vehicles that are allowed to operate in a space or the concentration of pollutants 
factories are allowed to emit. 
 
In summary, the concept of artificial comprehension provides us analytical purchase to  trace 
the memory of smart systems and interrogate and contest the way they alter how environments 
come to be registered, experienced and sensed. While the paper has identified two logics 
through which smart systems operate to alter the intelligibility of objects (dispersal and 
delimitation) in relation to the AURN network in particular, this is not to say that these are the 
only two logics at work. Neither is to say that the concept of artificial comprehension can only 
be used to analyse air pollution monitoring systems. Indeed, I would encourage those interested 
in smart systems to study their artificial comprehensions and identify other logics through 
which objects come to be comprehended. For instance, one might wish to analyse automated 
traffic light systems to understand how cars or traffic jams come to appear as objects and how 
this alters human comprehension around road planning or driver decision making in relation to 
journey routes. As spaces become increasingly filled with such smart systems and objects, it is 
important to identify these logics and the artificial comprehensions linked to them. In doing so 
we can alter these systems to generate comprehensions that enable social and political 
responses to the problems they are implicated in. 
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